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“Veritas est in puteo”. Democritus 
Modern universities are imbued by Aristotelian reason: there is the natural world and we who can explain it, 
knowle dge is feasible, and everything has an end, nothing goes on infinitely. This is the basic understanding of their 
endeavor. The second basic understanding of their endeavor is the influence of the industrial world and of the liber-
alization of knowledge. In the meantime, practical sciences turn to be in the highlight. Philosophical studies, to bring 
a major example in the humanities, are considered as unnecessary among this torrent of practical and very handy sci-
ences which know how to best invest the attributed funds. Nonetheless, Philosophy still comprises a major precondition 
for an education of humanism and for an education of critical thinking in the university as well as in other levels of 
education. Thus, Philosophy is by far the most practical and pragmatic science of all. On a level of principles when it 
comes to collective life, such as the life of education is, it is permissible to violate or alter these principles when this 
action provides us with the capability to move on to a better level of principles, not just to a different one. Philosophy, 
with its emphasis on the scientific method, on epistemology, on the ethical approach to every human action, to mention 
only a few of its functional parameters, brings better principles, principles that need to be employed in order for our 
species to continue to be able to reinstate our collective as well as individual thinking protocols.
Key words: philosophy, humanism, critical thinking, education, university, truth, knowledge, ethical action, criteria, 
methodology.
Панос Еліопулос
ФІЛОСОФСЬКА ОСВІТА ЯК ПЕРЕДУМОВА ДЛЯ НАВЧАННЯ ГУМАНІЗМУ  
І КРИТИЧНОГО МИСЛЕННЯ В УНІВЕРСИТЕТІ
Сучасні університети пронизані Арістотелівськими ідеями: існує природний світ і ми, хто може його по-
яснити, знання може стати реальністю, все має кінець, нічого не відбувається нескінченно. Це основне розу-
міння їх діяльності. Друге основне розуміння їх діяльності пов’язане із впливом індустріального світу і лібера-
лізації знань. Водночас практичні науки виявляються в центрі уваги. Філософські дослідження, якщо подати 
яскравий приклад зі сфери гуманітарних науках, вважають непотрібними серед цього потоку практичних і 
дуже корисних наук, які знають, як краще інвестувати кошти та використати ресурси. Проте філософія як 
і раніше містить у собі основну передумову для навчання гуманізму і для формування критичного мислення в 
університеті, а також на інших рівнях освіти. Таким чином, філософія, безумовно, є найбільш практичною і 
прагматичною наукою серед усіх. На рівні принципів, коли йдеться про колективне життя, таке як освіта, 
допустимо порушувати або змінювати ці принципи, коли ця дія дає нам можливість перейти на більш високий 
рівень принципів, а не тільки якийсь інший. Філософія, з її акцентом на науковий метод, епістемологію, етич-
ний підхід до кожної людської дії, якщо згадати лише деякі з її функціональних параметрів, творить кращі 
принципи, які повинні бути використані для того, щоб наш людський вид продовжував бути в змозі відновити 
наш колектив, а також окремі способи мислення.
Ключові слова: філософія, гуманізм, критичне мислення, освіта, університет, знання, моральна дія, кри-
терії, методологія.
Панос Элиопулос
ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ КАК ПРЕДПОСыЛКА ДЛЯ ОБУЧЕНИЯ ГУМАНИЗМА  
И КРИТИЧЕСКОГО МыШЛЕНИЯ В УНИВЕРСИТЕТЕ
Современные университеты пронизаны Аристотелевскими идеями: существует природный мир и мы, кто 
может его объяснить, знание может стать реальностью, все имеет конец, ничего не происходит бесконечно. 
Это основное понимание их деятельности. Второе основное понимание их деятельности связано с влиянием 
индустриального мира и либерализации знаний. Вместе с тем, практические науки оказываются в центре вни-
мания. Философские исследования, если взять наиболее выразительный пример из сферы гуманитарных наук, 
считаются ненужными для этого потока практических и очень полезных наук, которые знают, как лучше 
инвестировать средства или использовать ресурсы. Хотя философия, как и раньше, включает в себя основную 
предпосылку для обучения гуманизма и для формирования критического мышления в университете, а так-
же на других уровнях образования. Таким образом, философия, безусловно, является наиболее практической 
и прагматической наукой среди всех. На уровне принципов, когда речь идет о коллективной жизни, такой как 
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образование, допустимо нарушать или изменять эти принципы, когда это дейстиве дает нам возможность 
перейти на более высокий уровень принципов, а не только какой-то другой. Философия с ее акцентом на на-
учный метод, эпистемологию, этический подход к каждому человеческому дейстию, если вспомнить только 
некоторые с ее функиональных параметров, создает лучшие принципы, которые должны быть использованы 
для того, чтобы наш человеческий вид продолжал быть в состоянии воссоздать наш коллектив, а также 
некоторые способы мышления.
Ключевые слова: философия, гуманизм, критическое мышление, образование, университет, зна-
ние, моральное действие, критерии, методология.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his notes, in the Philosophical Grammar, quite predicatively remarks: “Tell 
me how you seek and I will tell you what you are seeking”1. Indeed, and I will side with this remark, how 
we seek points out to the direction of what we seek; this wittgensteinian comment seems to chart out, to an 
impressive extent, not only the nature of our quest but our own subjective perimeter, who we really are, for 
reasons that will be exposed in this paper. However, it needs to be stressed from the very beginning that if 
the definition of the method, and subsequently of the pursuit, the problem that we pose for resolution, is 
connected with the systematization of these related efforts of ours, it has to be seen whether there is a clear 
purpose in it, whether the purpose will guide us to a specific end, and if that end will serve for the benefit 
of us personally and of the human kind in general. Does the way we seek in the university, which consists 
the systematization of our highest educational efforts, clarify our social, political and individual aims? Does 
it serve to their benefit? Which is the acid test of truth for this question? Finally, what are the criteria that 
need to be employed?
Modern universities are imbued by Aristotelian reason, that to an extent: there is the natural world and 
we who can explain it, knowledge is feasible, and everything has an end, nothing goes on infinitely. This is 
the basic understanding of their endeavor. The second basic understanding of their endeavor is the influence 
of the industrial world and of the liberalization of knowledge. The university is open for everyone; in many 
cases worldwide, open for everyone who has enough money to pursue his studies, but seems almost unavoid-
ably to focus more and more on the practical side of our civilization. More funds are dispersed on medicine, 
engineering, computer science than for the humanities. The university seems to follow, and quite reasonably 
so, the trend of a necessity, where the necessity is to make this human world work faster, cheaper, better, 
more efficiently. But for whom, precisely?
In the context presented, practical sciences turn to be in the highlight. Philosophical studies, to bring 
a major example in the humanities, are considered as unnecessary among this torrent of practical and very 
handy sciences which know how to best invest the attributed funds. In the meantime, and while all this practi-
cal fuss is going on unremittingly, why should one worry about what Plato meant on episteme in his dialogue 
Theaetetus? Considering just the above can we be securely led to the affirmation that philosophy has little to 
do with the real world? Are philosophers impractical romantics who look up in the starry sky endeavouring 
to figure out celestial and human reality through a bunch of unsubstantiated hypotheses, with no instruments 
of precise measurements in their hands? And in the same spirit of assumption, why would someone prefer 
to study philosophy over mathematics, medicine, engineering, computer science, to name but a few? Cer-
tainly not for financial reasons, as philosophy seems to be by far the most interesting path to one’s personal 
poverty. All in all, what is the real object of philosophy, if there is any at all? If indeed there is, why would 
this object be important in the university curriculum today? Philosophy comprises a major precondition for 
an education of humanism, an education where the most prominent features of our species are emphasised, 
and also for an education of critical thinking in the university as well as in other levels of education. Thus, 
Philosophy, in my estimation, and this is what I will attempt to demonstrate in this paper, among a number 
of other parameters, is by far the most practical and pragmatic science of all. 
The issue of education and university education is inescapably related with the problem of truth. Philo-
sophical studies, for one thing, are closely related with theories of knowledge; as such they explore the epis-
temic criteria that all other sciences are in need of. This alone is no simple task. Let us for example see the 
humean analysis of this effort. For Hume every human action originates either from a motive of some kind or 
from reason2. The Scottish philosopher upholds that all propositions are based on a vague impression regard-
ing practical demands, an impression which is not rationalistic, does not come from right judgment and its 
source is not the intellect3. The functions of the intellect, the way it comprehends reality, logical necessities, 
1 Wittgenstein Ludwig, Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rees, translated by Anthony Kenny, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, 
24. – 370 р.
2 Bricke John, Mind and Morality. An Examination of Hume’s Moral Psychology, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. – Р. 6–7. 
3 Bricke John, Mind and Morality. An Examination of Hume’s Moral Psychology, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. – 106 р.
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as well as logical weaknesses, influence the way knowledge is perceived. Reality per se is affirmed inside 
its pure symptomatology, with no stable criterion to verify its objectivity4. According to Hume, the human 
being strives to construct knowledge on the basis of an inherent tendency to go from perception to an idea, as 
in the case from the perception of fire to the idea of heat. Knowledge, according to this view, proceeds from 
impressions derived from either the senses or the intellect. Baruch Spinoza estimates this almost similarly: 
“it is not we that affirm or negate something; it is the thing itself that inside us affirms or negates something 
of itself”5. 
In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume records this vivid problematic for the exploration for knowledge, 
an exploration for truth actually, on the steps of Plato when he discusses “episteme” (science) and “doxa” 
(opinion), as follows: “For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprises, when beside those 
numberless infirmities peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to human nature? Can I be sure, 
that in leaving all established opinions I am following truth; and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, 
even if fortune should at last guide me on her foot-steps? After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, 
I can give no reason why I should assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects 
strongly in that view, under which they appear to me”6. Hume’s skepticism is the skepticism of every won-
dering mind which feels prone to seek the criteriological beginning from which it will develop the fundamen-
tal principles of science and of knowledge intake; the very basis of education. What Hume clarifies is that in 
the quest for knowledge, experience is involved, as a principle that provides us with information about the 
several relations of things in the past and also ethos is involved, as a principle that guides us so as to expect 
the same results of these relations in the future. Without these two principles, the human intellect would not 
be able to substantiate any logical argument nor to extend its activity to objects other than those which are 
directly subdued to the sphere of our senses. In that case, we would be able to accept only perceptions which 
would be currently present in our consciousness and perhaps nowhere else at the same moment7, especially 
if we consider in this hypothesis Bergson’s view of time perceived as space8. 
Wittgenstein comes at stage again, to facilitate our contemplation on philosophy and on the truth prob-
lem: “Philosophy is philosophical problems. Their common element extends as far as the common element 
in different regions of our language. Something that at first sight looks like a proposition and is not one. 
Something that looks like a design for a steamroller and is not one”9. As Wittgenstein has just shown, one 
thing that philosophy is, is a search inside the phenomenal world, it is the effort for the recognition of things 
through language. That is what Hume exhibited as well: a profound and lasting, not unjustifiable at all, anxi-
ety for our capability for knowledge, our capacity to exceed what we already think that we know. Philosophy 
is an instrument to beat illusion. Among other uses, it is such an instrument in the form of a certain compila-
tion of signs. Wittgenstein quoted again: “But if you say: ‘How am I to know what someone means, when 
I see nothing but the signs he gives?’ then I say: ‘How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing 
but the signs either?’ What is spoken can only be explained in language, and so in this sense language itself 
cannot be explained. Language must speak for itself”10. Analytic philosophy comprehends the importance of 
communication, the importance of utilizing a well defined and meaningful language to convey meaning. The 
problem of language is the problem of truth, and both, truth and language, the means to convey and identify 
any human thought, apart from science are prominent enterprises behind any method. This leads us to the 
claim that philosophy can serve as the method behind all method, an instrument for logic, for distinction, for 
critical thinking; a claim that we will explore even more in continuation. 
Having inherited an era of humanism, we need to realize that the humanist approach has its own limita-
tions and philosophy indeed can help us in it again. Humanism is the philosophical and ethical stance that 
emphasizes the value and agency of human beings, individually and collectively, and prefers critical think-
ing and evidence over acceptance of dogma. The meaning of the term humanism of course has fluctuated in 
the history of philosophy. Generally, however, humanism refers to a perspective that affirms the notion of 
human freedom and progress. This is more than an ideological rhetoric; humanism in fact has been able to 
4 Deleuze Gilles, Spinoza. Philosophie Pratique, translated in Greek by K. Kapsampeli, Nisos, Athens 1996, Р. 225–226.
5 Deleuze Gilles, Spinoza. Philosophie Pratique, translated in Greek by K. Kapsampeli, Nisos, Athens 1996. – 88 р.
6 Hume David, Treatise of Human Nature, Translated by M. Pournari, Patakis, Athens 2011. – 458 р.
7 Hume David, Treatise of Human Nature, Translated in Greek by M. Pournari, Patakis, Athens 2011, p. 459. Cf. Waxman 
Wayne, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
8 Cf. Bergson Henri, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Translated by K. Papagiorgis, Kastaniotis, Athens 1998, 
Р. 311–322.
9 Wittgenstein Ludwig, Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rees, translated by Anthony Kenny, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, 
141. – 30 р.
10 Wittgenstein Ludwig, Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rees, translated by Anthony Kenny, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1974. – 40 р.
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fabricate the human being to feel superior to any other being on the planet, even superior to the planet itself. 
Postmodern critics, such as Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault, have already foreseen this danger, 
that humanism can be used as a pretext for imperialism and domination of those deemed less than human, 
including unfortunate others. Nonetheless, humanism may be the safest and fastest approach we have to keep 
dealing with the truth problem and with our management of the planet.
So let us go back to the problem of truth and connect it with humanism, and see more of why philosophi-
cal studies are so important in the university syllabus; with an aim to see why one should study philosophy 
in this material-loving and passionately consuming world. For William James, the problem of truth is quite 
complex and related with our attitude to knowledge, humanism, our beliefs, our efficiency in science, our ca-
pability for critical thinking, among other things. James remarks that neither the whole of truth nor the whole 
of good is revealed to any single observer11. This shows to the direction of a combination of contemplative 
and methodological approaches that will be necessary in order to address the issue of truth. And philoso-
phy, mainly as epistemology, offers a lot in this regard. James continues by upholding that we, the highly 
educated classes, are trained to seek the rare, the exquisite exclusively, and to overlook the common12. We 
have become elitists that may be skipping the main core of things. Could critical thinking, with the aid of 
the methodological value of philosophy, bring us back to considering the common again, to see the primary 
reasons for science once more?
Common practice is not deprived of the tragic element, as the ancient Greeks rightly foresaw. James 
believes that the world is made on a specific pattern, tragically practical. The reason is that the actually pos-
sible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; that is how there is always a gap between the 
actual and the ideal which can be got through only by leaving part of the ideal behind. In education, like in 
all other spheres of human activity, we feel often enforced to abandon the ideal for the sake of the practically 
feasible. However, since some part of the ideal must be left behind, we need to know precisely which part 
that will be13. It seems to me that this is mainly the philosopher’s task. That puts philosophy, as it is already 
historically, in the beginning of the specific awareness. 
For the American pragmatist, what we know determines what we notice. I would like to add that what 
we notice determines who we become. Reality is the vaguest term of all, because we add things and notions 
to what we perceive through the senses and the intellect, because we are creative beings. Our minds exert 
an arbitrary choice; by their inclusions and omissions, by the emphasis our minds give to different aspects, 
we partly create reality, we partly foresee knowledge. Truth for us is simply a collective name for verifica-
tion processes, according to the school of pragmatism14. The fact remains that humanism, critical thinking 
and truth are equally very important things which we cannot dissociate from the university. But we must be 
cautious, with all the tolerance to theory that philosophy teaches; no truth can be so firm as to never fail and 
rationalism should not allow us to get carried away. As William James rightly observes: “The Truth, what 
a perfect idol for the rationalistic mind… [it seems that] in everything there must be one system that is right 
and every other wrong”15. Eventually, to know an object means to lead to it through a context that the world 
supplies16. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good for defi-
nite, assignable reasons17. Ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with 
other parts of our experience18. We plunge into the field of fresh experience with the beliefs our ancestors and 
we have made already; these determine what we notice as significant, as a significant truth. The pragmatic 
method in philosophy implies that truths should have practical consequences: the truth of any statement 
consists in the consequences19.
Thus, William James sets before us an interesting view about the nature of truth, a view that makes again 
evident why philosophical studies should be a critical precondition in today’s university due to its ability 
to discern in depth such theoretical and methodological issues: “The truth of a proposition depends on its 
usefulness, on its serving a particular need. Truth with no practical effect is of no use. If I ask one ‘what is 
11 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 285 р.
12 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 281 р.
13 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 255 р.
14 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 96 р.
15 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 105 р.
16 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 143 р.
17 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 38 р.
18 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000. – 30 р.
19 James William, Pragmatism and other writings, Penguin, New York, 2000, p. 146. Cf. ibid, p. 88: “Pragmatism asks this 
question: grant an idea or belief to be true. What concrete difference will its being true make in one’s actual life? How will the truth 
be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What is the truth’s value in 
experiential terms?”.
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the time?’ and he answers: ‘I am Mr Smith’, then his response is of no importance to me even if what he ut-
ters is true. If truth is disconnected from practical interest and from human activity, then its existence is not 
substantiated or necessary. This conception of non-abstract truth generates a range of truths that are selected 
in accordance with the temporary environment in which they are found. E.g. water is not only the chemi-
cal molecule H2O but also a liquid that will quench my thirst, or a substance that helps me keep clean”20. 
Its many definitions provide diverse aspects of the truth, all equal among them, all functional or useful at 
the time of inquiry21. 
As we have seen so far, Philosophy is the need of people to know right from wrong. But that not only 
epistemically. Let us gain some insights into that while exploring why philosophical studies are a precon-
dition for an education of humanism and critical thinking at the university level. The same perception, to 
a certain extent, permeates the Hellenistic era. In the philosophical disciplines of the time, emphasis is 
constantly given on self correction as the sole means of returning to the primal and authentic reality of 
the person. Seneca in his Dialogi and Epistulae as well as Iamblichus, through his recording of the Py-
thagorean life in the De Vita Pythagorica bring to light a way of living which has been constructed on 
the grounds of unlimited credence in man’s inherent abilities for the attainment of wisdom. Man can be edu-
cated humanistically, he can be guided to a complete metamorphotic procedure by means of which his life will 
be rendered eudaimonistic despite his mortal nature22. Knowledge is considered to be the first philosophical 
demand in the perspective of an “ars vitae”. The alienation of man from his nature is the consequent axiom-
atic acceptance which this art is called to resolve. It also resolves the conflicting nature of the human being, 
along with the inner conflicts that inhibit psychological progress. The right criterion for proper social behav-
iour is, as Pythagoras induces, similarly with Plato in some of his dialogues, for each person to be himself in 
the exact manner that he would like others to perceive him. Under the prism of this heterogenous compari-
son, man has a measure for himself that keeps him integrated into the social corpus23. Education, self educa-
tion, are important because they facilitate the political effort of bringing the individual to society, the person 
to communality and to the political life. That is the result of a practising mind, not of a mind that memorises 
or follows thinking protocols. Pythagoras claimed that it is not possible to consider “dianoia” as the best of 
things and according to it to make all decisions and still not dispose of any time or effort for focused ascesis, 
training, on it. The education that influences and shapes the intellect is the only thing that remains intact in 
life, the only indisputable assistance in the existential strife24. Education is so important and critical due to 
the fact that it depends on man’s proairesis, on his free will. Thus it is rendered the only factor that distin-
guishes the free from those who are enslaved25, a conception that follows even the school of Frankfurt and 
the pedagogical views of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and others later on. 
Referring directly to the essence of Pedagogy, the sage from the island of Samos suggests though that it 
should be desirable to those who are not very capable of learning, to be benefited by what they see betters 
do and by following their example, by pursuing a set paradigm26. The spectre of the paradigm has been ne-
glected, perhaps as being too romantic or not feasible in modern education, especially so in the university; 
as if the university teacher is deprived of his pedagogical role, sterilised in a process that recognizes in him 
or her only the limited mission of higher knowledge on a particular discipline of science. What a narrow 
conception of education this seems when contrasted with the multifaceted needs and abilities of a modern 
person, with a plethora of social roles to say the least, an employee, a citizen, a person as an aftermath of 
the ideas of the Enlightenment. The moral approach is necessary in education, insists Pythagoras. By means 
of a metaphor he explains that it is like desiring to show the sun to someone who cannot look at it directly 
with bare eyes and as a consequence the only thing that can be used is the reflection on water or on tar, 
as a kind of speculum27. Wisdom is the real science that is related with the knowledge of the beautiful, 
the appropriate, and the significant. Philosophy is the untainted zeal for this theory28. As a corrective science, 
philosophy works deeply inside the ontological level.
20 Pelegrinis Theodosis, Lexiko tis Filosofias, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 2004. – P. 42–43.
21 See William James, Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy, Longmans, 
Green, and Company, New York 1907. Also, William James, The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to ‘Pragmatism’, Longmans, Green, 
and Company, New York, 1909.
22 Iamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, VI. 30: «ἵνα τό τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τε καί φιλοσοφίας σωτήριον ἔναυσμα χαρίσηται τῆ θνητῆ 
φύσει».
23 Iamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, IX. 46.
24 Iamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, VIII. 42.
25 Iamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, VIII. 44.
26 Iamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, XV. 66.
27 Iamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, XV. 67.
28 Iamblichus, De Vita Pythagorica, XII. 59: «καλή μέν οὖν καί αὕτη παιδείας ἦν ἐπιμέλεια ἡ συντείνουσα αὐτῶ πρός τήν τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ἐπανόρθωσιν».
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For Seneca, the Roman Stoic, philosophy is all that the human being has in his possession in order to 
alleviate the pain and anguish of his inauthentic life. This notion is based primarily on his acceptance that 
philosophy is both an art (ars) and a science (scientia)29. Seneca considers philosophy to be a moral and ra-
tional art30, furthermore, an awakening force: “Sola autem nos philosophia excitabit, sola somnum excutiet 
gravem. Illi te totum dedica” [Philosophy is the only power that can stir us, the only power that can shake 
off our deep slumber. Devote yourself wholly to philosophy]31. When the individual commences spending 
his time with philosophy then, Seneca assures, there is an abysmal gap created between him and the other 
ordinary people32. The Roman philosopher realizes that it is all about a matter of self knowledge practically: 
where there has been accumulated too much redundant knowledge there is no space for the knowledge of 
virtue, therefore no space for self knowledge. The senecan art of life is not an advance at this point but a 
transition to the innate potentiality and capability. In this context, the teacher is not the authoritative figure 
who seizes all knowledge. Philosophy makes all equal, despite rank, race or origin33. Self relationship is the 
first and indispensable phase before the sage reaches out to society. His “humanitas”, i.e. his philanthropy, 
is always the criterion for the participation of others on the route to wisdom. In the senecan theory man is 
not orientated to a “political” conformity with everyday experience. The therapy of all inadequacy that the 
human being may suffer from, instantly places him in a frame of new existence, a genuine life experience or 
an art of living according to unwavering methodological principles. 
 Let us bring the above in a modern perspective and see them in their functionality. Generally speaking, the 
systems which are served through education are culture and economics. When humanism is not defended at 
modern schools, then economics becomes ideology and we deter students and teachers from serving culture, 
thus creating a school of authoritarian if not totalitarian stance. Modern education has turned to serving the 
needs of the thymos (passions, in the platonic sense), the needs which are dictated by desire. So how are the 
principles of humanism, right reason, self correction, excellence, as depicted in the theories of pythagorean-
ism and stoicism served? In practice, in our epoch, this is an education for consumers and technocrats, which 
is not concerned with autonomous and complete cultural experiences34; on the contrary an education which 
would estimate classical studies highly would be a locus where the lack of the medium could be evidenced 
more clearly35. Modern education suffers from many of the pathologies that Plato notices regarding the soph-
ist way of education. In the sophist scheme, the errors committed are the following: a) the sophists teach the 
technical lessons and those which are for real education, namely culture, in the same way (the former regard 
technical skills and the latter concern humanistic studies, b) they believe that what is sought in education is to 
fill the soul of the learner with cognitive material, c) they do not accomplish to teach virtue as they are mor-
ally neutral, they do not serve any moral idea or moral orientation, d) they receive money from their students, 
thus damaging the internal human link between teacher and learner. The problems which arise from the 
sophistical penetration into our educational system are manifold. The produced and transmitted knowledge 
is frequently of propagandistic or instrumental nature. But this is not proper practice to teach exclusively a 
cognitive item without any care for the humanistic principles that will ensure the proper and critical use of 
this item. Similarly, no lesson can be taught without any reference whatsoever to the manner, the method of 
how to contemplate and how to form new, innovative thinking. As a result we have classes which function 
under the pretext of pedagogy but with nothing pedagogical in them. Hence, Barrow & Woods, two Ameri-
can philosophers of education, assert that education is considered to be the commitment to what is believed 
to be significant. In this spirit, education is committed to change the human being to the better36. Classical 
studies, philosophical studies and the humanities can imbue university courses and scientific disciplines with 
this idea. Nonetheless, it needs to be clarified that offering such studies as the humanities and in particular 
philosophical studies cannot be an end in itself; it should produce an educational result of the highest caliber, 
a result derived from the development of critical reason which will make the educational effort meaningful 
and constructive in its totality; this signifies the passage from technicality to morality, to the moral stance 
of an educated person, as a social person, as a whole person, who seeks eudemonia. For the Athenian Plato 
there is no wisdom alone, without virtue; the two need to be perplexed and interdependent. Let us remember 
29 Seneca, Epistulae Morales, ΧΧΧI. 8.
30 Bruhl Lèvy, La morale et la science des mœurs, F. Alcan, Paris, 1937. – 223 p. 
31 Seneca, Epistulae Morales, LIII. 8.
32 Seneca, Epistulae Morales, LIII. 9-10.
33 Seneca, Epistulae Morales, XLIV. 1-2.
34 Anton John, “The classical education of the Greeks and its ecumenical spirit”. In K. Boudouris (ed.), The Philosophy of Greek 
Education, Ionia, Athens, 1991. – P. 13–27.
35 Anton John, “The classical education of the Greeks and its ecumenical spirit”. In K. Boudouris (ed.), The Philosophy of Greek 
Education, Ionia, Athens, 1991. – P. 13–27.
36 Barrow Robin & Woods Ronald, An Introduction to Philosophy of Education, 4th edition, Routledge, New York, 2006. – P. 9.
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the platonic words in the dialogue Menexenus: «πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης 
ἀρετῆς πανουργία͵ οὐ σοφία φαίνεται» [every form of knowledge when sundered from justice and the rest 
of virtue is seen to be plain roguery rather than wisdom]37.
Certainly, in Ancient Greek Philosophy, the educational effort is intertwined not only with a gnoseologi-
cal aspect but also with an aim to facilitate personal development in the sense of embracing especially those 
ethical values that are essential for human living. Science and an ethical awareness of life are founded on the 
premise of logos, reason and orientate the human being to the telos of eudaimonia. In meeting with the world 
and its phenomena the human being has the capacity to overcome this discrepancy by means of principles so 
as to become not only a knowledgeable but also a better being. In the Presocratic thought there are already 
elements that point to the direction of approaches which consider the person in a perspective of continuous 
development towards a certain telos, as in the case of the Ionian philosophers, the Atomic philosophers and 
others who exert their pedagogical activity in the Greek cities aiming at students’ most efficient improve-
ment. Plato places the emphasis on his theory of knowledge whereas he gives insights on the importance 
of the moral educational method which pursues the holistic development of the citizen who is trained to 
participate in the ideal polis along with that of the person who transcends his desires and uses dialectics or 
Eros to reach the highest Good. Such education, as demonstrated in the allegory of the cave, is meant to free 
individuals from false opinions and convictions. Aristotle makes manifest the human potential for perfection 
and highlights certain ethical practices created in the context of education. His didactic proposals are not 
technical; they rather address the multifaceted aspects and needs of the human nature through the practices 
of “hexis” (habit) and “mesotes” (mean). In ethical activity Aristotle anticipates a comparison with a work of 
beauty. The creation of a perfect human being, an individual that has acquired intellectual and ethical virtues, 
is the most worthy artefact, an “ergon kalon”. The Greek conception of education is a critical commitment 
not only to the metaphysical premises of right reason but also to the thesis that personal as well as collective 
progress cannot be dissociated from an implementation of ethical values in daily life. 
Ortega y Gasset, the modern Spanish existentialist, proposes another hermeneutics which interprets the 
components of the crisis we face in our societies and in our education, so that a crisis is not considered to 
mean a financial or political crisis solely, neither a value crisis, but a crisis of the human factor on the whole. 
Ortega’s remarks necessitate the presence of the awareness that philosophy and critical thinking are abso-
lutely essential. Ortega y Gasset theorizes strongly against rationalism, claiming that the fundamental error 
that rationalism allows is its own dominance on life, which means that life is deprived of the physical ele-
ment and the human being is deprived of its vital potencies.38 This wrong evaluation of rationality and its role 
is the fundamental reason for the creation of the masses; masses that Adorno later on will call “half educated 
masses” despite their huge amount of access to university courses and to a number of degrees. Ortega sug-
gests that science, ethics, art, religious faith, justice, have escaped the place of subjective awareness and have 
obtained an objective utility that does not allow them to be functional and effective. An objective culture 
ends up against the subjective element that gave birth to it.39 Pure reason cannot be right reason.40 The mod-
ern westerner has gained technical knowledge but he is a barbarian as regards his limited understanding of 
the driving forces of the creation of his culture. He is an ignorant, whose only knowledge refers to technical 
development, but misses the true essence of life, the morale behind the benefits, which is no other than obli-
gation and commitment to a certain target. Thus, very usefully for today’s discussion, the philosopher from 
Madrid diagnoses an increasing homogeneity in the western world, which is responsible for the creation of 
the deep crisis of the 20th century. “El hombre masa”, the mass-man, is responsible for this crisis. This type 
of man, the modern man, is characterized by the idola fori, with no internal reference whatsoever, so similar 
all over the western sphere, docile to the international imperatives of fashion, ways of life, current values, 
opinions, and ideas. This type of man is held accountable, by Ortega, for this “asphyxiating monotony” that 
has dominated all the so-called civilized places, among them universities. The mass man can be formed ac-
cording to anything, which makes manifest that he is a vacant being. Similarly the world seems empty of 
purposes, anticipations, ideals. Nobody has concerned himself with supplying them, Ortega remarks. We 
could add, quite securely: nobody has pondered effectively how to overturn this scheme of education that 
leads to this lack of pluralism, this lack of culture, of active humanitarianism, of innovative historical effort.
37 Plato, Menexenus, 247 a.
38 Ortega y Gasset Jose, En Torno a Galileo (Esquema de las Crisis), Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, Madrid 1956, 
lección V: “Lo humano es la vida del hombre, no su cuerpo, ni siquiera su alma.”
39 Ortega y Gasset Jose, En Torno a Galileo (Esquema de las Crisis), Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 
1956. – P. 64–65.
40 Cf. Esperanza Guisán, Razón y pasión en ética. Los dilemas de la ética contemporánea, Anthropos, Barcelona 1986, passim.
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The mass man practically lives in the darkness, having been subjugated to a deterministic adoption of the 
collective desiderata; he is losing the potential to remain open to a superior level of life.41 In this epoch, the 
presence of a mass is more noticeable than that of any preceding period, but differing from the traditional 
type in that it remains hermetically enclosed within itself, incapable of submitting to anything or anybody, 
believing itself self-sufficient. The mass man is the average man; in this manner, what used to be only a 
quantitative definition is now also a qualitative one. This qualitative trait leads to the affirmation that each 
man is so uncritical, no dissimilar to others, therefore he belongs to a type of genus (tipo genérico). As a con-
sequence, the mass man is the man who “feels like everybody else” and who also feels at comfort with the 
admittance that he evaluates himself as almost identical with anyone else. Thus the different, the individual, 
the capable, the noble, are disregarded, ignored, or rejected. Whoever is not like “everybody else,” whoever 
does not contemplate like “everybody else,” is in danger of being trodden upon by the horde of barbarians 
which is the mass. By this conversion of quantity into quality there has been achieved a genesis, of a type of 
human being whose desires, ideas, ways of life, and every life reference, coincide with those of the homoge-
neous massive collectivity which he is also part of. The hermetic man, el hombre masa, among other things, 
most importantly loses his personal mark, his authenticity. So does the western culture through the repetition 
of an education that becomes more and more focused on technical detail rather than fresh, critical, creative, 
substantial and original thinking. 
Ortega holds responsible three distinct factors for this dominance of the masses and for the loss of any 
character of critical thinking in our moral, political and educational action: liberal democracy, scientific 
advancement and industrialism. In the field of science, there are now more elements, more clues, more tech-
niques and branches than ever before. While the traditional professions were very few, the fragmentation of 
science has now created relevant new professions.42 Even though we are in an era during which we have the 
knowledge and skills to achieve so much, it is apparent that we do not possess what is most crucial: a specific 
target setting process. This crucial absence of orientation leaves man incomplete, inauthentic. Is any other 
science able to fulfill this role better than Philosophy? Paradoxically, despite the fragmentation of science 
and professions, the crowd appears as a singularity, that has been conquered by the goods of the technologi-
cal culture. Inside this almost unexpected abundance of tools, abilities and goods, provided by the techno-
logical culture, man stands aghast, bared from any aims and visions.43 In schools, it has been impossible to do 
more than instruct the masses in the technique of modern life; it has been impossible to educate them. They 
have been given tools for an intenser form of existence, but no feeling for their great historic duties, no sense 
of individual self completion44. Ortega y Gasset’s reference to axiology principally aims at highlighting a life 
of “servitude for something transcendental.” The man, who is not vulgar, grows restless and invents some 
new gnomon, more difficult, more exigent, to adhere to, a life of obligation and duty. This is life lived as a 
discipline, life against the radical solitude (soledad radical) of the human being45. 
The words of philosophy and the proper knowledge and use of language are indispensable, for the Greek 
enlightener Adamantios Korais [19th century], in order to lead the people to the acquisition of virtue through 
education. The relationship between language and morality is mutually functional and effective, as one who 
does not use the concepts correctly, also does not call and does not use morals correctly either. According 
to Korais: “If the barbarization of the language, twisting the true meanings of the words, ends in the corrup-
tion of morals, it is deduced that the correction of the language also corrects the morals of the nation and 
makes them meeker. Virtue, justice, prudence, sainthood, and even more, countless words, which denote the 
dispositions of the soul, mean another thing in an uneducated man’s mouth and another in the enlightened 
man’s mouth”46. This means that the common people must be educated. The scholar from the island of Chios 
upholds that a people must be a people of philosophers, in the sense of seekers of wisdom, able to live by 
the theoretical principles that will allow them a true and meaningful life, not only commercially and produc-
tively effective. People deserve lives of freedom. Freedom from the darkness of ignorance is the most fearful 
of all. People, who are deprived of education, are deprived of freedom as well.
41 Ortega y Gasset Jose, En Torno a Galileo (Esquema de las Crisis), Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 
1956. – P. 32–33.
42 Ortega y Gasset Jose, La rebellion de las masas. Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1979. – 71 p.
43 Ortega y Gasset Jose, La rebellion de las masas. Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1979. – 74 p.
44 Ortega y Gasset Jose, En Torno a Galileo (Esquema de las Crisis), Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, Madrid 1956, 
lección V.
45 Ortega’s examination on the qualitative criteria, which should be supportive to the individual and collective effort for 
excellence, is taken from the point of view of vitalism and perspectivism, whereas it also confronts with the questions raised by the 
phenomenological approach of the common life.
46 Adamantios Korais, Prolegomena to the Ancient Greek Writers, vol. Ι, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 
Athens, 1986. – 504 p.
–
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Regarding the role of philosophy in the enlightenment and education of people, Korais notes in his Im-
provised Meditations on the Greek Education and Language47: “Philosophy does not only tackle with the 
problem of the correction of one’s mind but also of one’s will. Where you may see a malignant and perverse 
man, do not doubt that his malice is the result either of total lack of any education or of bad and unme-
thodical education”. In such statements Korais connects modern educational strife with the realizations of 
Socrates48, with the certainty that man is not naturally evil, but evil is the result of bad thinking, of bad exis 
(habit) and ignorance. Education is an ontological process, directly connected with refining man so that he 
can be a better being49. Furthermore, it is a work of pacification, honesty and virtue50. This recognizes an 
education based on targeting claims and not on a random cultural basis. It includes the enlightening concept 
of “anthropourgia” (making of people), i.e. the formation of people according to an axiological-formative 
exemplar which will influence constructively and imbue the natural constitution of man so as to render man 
eudemonistic but also socially beneficial. Moral values, as considered in the Greek Enlightenment, must 
be mixed with scientific action, they must comprise an unaltered and unswerving component of education. 
The moral and practical proposal of the new Greek philosophy focuses attention on the education of young 
people and, salva veritate, on lifelong education, in the form of an endless quest and effort for virtue, on the 
one hand, and individual and political eudemonia, on the other. Values  are not placed in a utopian manner 
in the minds of societies and individuals. Virtue is teachable but at the same time it is a daily, not automated 
pursuit. It mostly comprises a war against bad habits, therefore it mobilises man’s best abilities and devoted 
will. This is the uncompromising message, the broad anthropocentric conception of the Enlightenment. 
Edward Wilson rightly remarks that: “Knowledge humanely acquired and widely shared, related to hu-
man needs but kept free of political censorship, is the real science for the people”51. This real science, as Wil-
son calls it, is the starting point of free expression and for access to truth values, a compass for synthesis and 
organization inside any democratic society and any antiauthoritarian educational system. The danger shall 
always remain that the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge can be assymetrical to the situation of those 
who are underprivileged. The answer may indeed start from a subjectivist view of individual value (using 
personal preferences as the basis for an account of a person’s welfare) and relate the individual good to the 
collective good within a framework52. From my perspective, values, especially within the context of univer-
sity education, should not be taken for granted; they ought to be re-invented (especially within the context of 
university studies, with the main aid of philosophy which is the major guide in this process), re-established, 
re-confirmed anew in any form of social unity, as the immobility of values in accordance with old ideals, 
uncritically inherited from previous centuries, would lead to an unacceptable prevention of the historical 
progress, especially in western society. It remains exceedingly difficult to establish truth objectively. How 
can one objectively prove that a particular society’s dependence on certain values is erroneous beyond con-
tradiction? Which are the methodological loci on which differences of tradition and modern theorizations 
can be met and reconciled? Perhaps notions of scientific or philosophical objectivity will need to be relaxed, 
if the concept of truth is to operate in a political and educational environment. As Aristotle suggested, po-
litical and social truths are true for the most part and are far from absolute. Therefore, a kind of structured 
subjectivism may prove workable, so long as it does not degrade into a vulgar relativism. 
What counts is that professional science, should not take the form of theology, should not become fun-
damentalist in its pursuits and aspirations, nor should it enjoy the solitary privilege to possess truth. If not 
conducive to the public good, whichever that good is concluded to be within the limits of a moral consensus 
shared by members of a community, the search for truth would remain futile in the practical level of making 
people’s lives better and enhancing their bond with their polis. That is why philosophical studies are so im-
portant; because they are the critical tool. Under this prism, humanism cannot be a product of rhetoric but it 
comprises a valuable political and educational event, a most essential certain episteme. The democratic ideal 
and therefore the quest for the significant truth that is indispensable for educational action is supposed to 
contribute to people’s welfare. That unavoidably will always take us to a discussion about what are the con-
stituents of this welfare: a rapid increase in our convenience of purchasing material goods or eudemonia in 
47 Adamantios Korais, Prolegomena to the Ancient Greek Writers, vol. Ι, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 
Athens 1986. – P. 178–179.
48 Cf. Sotiris Fournaros, “Socrates in Koraes”, Journal for Classical Studies MS, n. 7 (2005). – P. 91–102.
49 For a thorough guide on education in the years under discussion see Konstantinos Malafantis, The pedagogy of neohellenic 
enlightenment, Poreia, Athens, 2001.
50 Adamantios Korais, Prolegomena to the Ancient Greek Writers, vol. Ι, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 
Athens, 1986. – 159 p.
51 Edward Wilson, “Academic Vigilantism and the Political Significance of Sociobiology”. In Bioscience, 26, 1976. – P. 187–190.
52 Paul Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001. – 116 p.
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the ancient Greek philosophical perspective? Is this type of society, this type of university, allowed to change 
our values if the truth that is revealed points out to that direction as a necessity and not as mere choice? De-
spite the deontological quest for objectivity53, despite our inability to verify or assert true facts, truth, even in 
its potentially fractional forms, should not be abandoned in a number of semantic constructions, but, instead, 
it ought to encourage towards a conscious and consistent method. 
Philosophy is necessary if you want to have political choice in learning and access to knowledge. Other 
systems usually offer predesigned decisions or answers. At the beginning of philosophy, philosophy as dia-
lectics, there is problem setting, the question; therefore dialectics, as Aristotle explains in Topica, in Prior 
Analytics and in Posterior Analytics, is headed to the area of “inventio”, as an attempt to extract logical 
arguments. By this approach of critical thinking what is mainly pursued is for one to be able to use his cog-
nitive and evaluative capability in order to meet the demands of everyday life and discourse. For Aristotle, 
those who do not comprehend the meaning and the power of the words may be led to irrational attitudes and 
thoughts. In fact, there is a gap between thought, language and reality as human beings have to use discourse 
instead of the things themselves. The Stagirite upholds that dialectics can offer the method for proper com-
munication, based on definitions and logical thinking, in an ethical way. The essence of critical thinking is 
evaluation, a mental procedure by which claims, allegations and arguments are assessed54. As such it remains 
as a constant pursuit, of purely dialectical form, which principally recognises the logical elaboration of the 
existential and empirical data as the most appropriate, despite the ontological, metaphysical psychological 
and epistemological obscurities due to which this activity is hindered. The most reliable approach, in an en-
vironment which keeps us vigilant about the relativity of any type of knowledge, is the critical and dialectical 
approach, the non abandonment of the critical subject, i.e. the human being, to the dark, interior space of our 
language and intellect, a certain advancement towards the world that is and the world that we are. Teaching, 
while it considers as a sine que non condition the logical practice, the logical elenchus on the syllogisms, and 
comprehends the dynamic and unalterable connection between reality, human intellect and language, can 
be implemented not only as pedagogy but also as the terminus a quo for the practical as well as theoretical 
influences of critical thinking. 
In my view, we are relational, not isolated beings, and that in a twofold way: one is with the necessity of 
communication and coordination with other human beings and one is with the surrounding space, with real-
ity. In all these interactions, there is a personal hint, a personal mark, which originates from our own distinct 
and unique contribution, in our unique and distinct being, that redefines these relations. Still, this is a world 
of unfamiliarity, uncanniness, “unheimlichkeit”. “Barbarus hic ego sum, quia non intelligor illis” [Here I am 
a barbarian, because nobody understands me], Ovid writes in his Tristia. How do we proceed with this gap, 
which is not only a gnoseological but also an existential breach? The one thing that counts in philosophy is 
that a man should see things, see them straight in his own peculiar way and be dissatisfied with any opposite 
way of seeing them55. This is the only pragmatic way, the only scientific way. On a level of principles when 
it comes to collectivity, to collective life, it is permissible to violate or alter these principles when this action 
provides us with the capability to move on to a better level of principles, not just to a different one. Being 
“different” per se is not a value, an ability or a virtue. In the same sense, “variety” is morally, politically 
or educationally speaking, a neutral term, it does not necessarily induce a negative or positive coloration 
but only it induces an analogical, according to certain secondary attributes that may accompany it. A better 
principle, a better method or action is introduced in the form of a necessary principle, method or action in 
the sense that it may be able to ameliorate the totality of the principles of the collective form in which we are 
included. This is how philosophy is necessary in our university curriculum, also in our thinking systems and 
protocols, as a good and ameliorative principle, not as a principle in difference to others. 
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